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I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T 
O F T H E S T A T E 0 F U T A H 
LUTHER H. THOMAS, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
vs . 
GLEN PETERSON, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t , 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
^ i 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE ) 
This is an action to forfeit and terminate the 
interest of the Defendant JoeTs Valley, Inc. in and to the 
property known as Joe's Valley Marina by virtue of a sales 
agreement between Plaintiff and said Defendant, containing 
title retaining and forfeiture provisions and to quiet title 
to said property as against persons claiming through the 
Defendant Joe!s Valley, Inc., including the Defendant Glen 
Peterson. 
CASE NO. 13547 
i 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court held that the interest of the 
Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc., in the property known as Joe's 
Valley Marina, acquired by reason of the sales agreement 
referred to repeatedly herein as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, 
was forfeited and terminated and that all persons claiming 
by and through said Defendant, including the Defendant Glen 
Peterson had no right, title or interest therein and 
declared that Plaintiff was the owner thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, seeks to affirm the decision of the 
lower Court, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS , 
Plaintiff does not agree with Appellant's Statement 
of Facts and herein recites said facts as he sees them. The 
specific differences regarding said facts are largely set out 
in Plaintiff's Argument No. V. Since the pages of the reporter' 
transcript and the record contain duplicate numbers, the pages 
of the reporters transcrip will be referred to herein by the 
designation UT" and the pages of the record by the designation " 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiff-Respondent, Luther H. Thomas, an 
unsophisticated individual (He said that he had no knowledge 
of how to form a corporation and didn't know what an 
incorporator was although he was listed as one ,/T 42 & 43/. 
He referred to the Corporate Charter as it first set of By-
Laws /T 101, 102, 110/ -- Counsel for Defendant was able to 
confuse him regarding his status as owner of the assets of 
the Marina vs. his status as the owner of stock of the 
•*k 
*>• 
corporation /T 46, 47, 48, 53, 64 & 637) built the property 
known as Joe's Valley Marina (distinguished from Joe's Valley 
Marina, Inc., a corporation which later changed its name to 
Joe's Valley, Inc.) from scratch from his own savings (T 6) and 
with monies borrowed from his sister-in-law and her husband, 
the Falsones (T 23 & 66). $ 
\% 
•At' 
Because of his failing health (T 5 & 6), he 
wished to dispose of the Marina and agreed to sell it to a 
group of 11 men (T 7 & 8) who intended to operate it and 
other properties (a coal mine and concrete batch plant /T 19 & i 
through a corporation which they then formed for that purpose 
--Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. (T 7) They apparently also intendei 
to promote a public stock offering (T 62). Plaintiff 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
testified that he entered into a pre-incorporation agreement 
with those same men (T 7 & 8) which was later incorporated into 
the agreement between Plaintiff and the corporation, referred 
to in the transcript as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, the 
admissability of which was the subject of much discussion at 
the trial. That agreement was signed by Julian R. Taylor, the 
President of the corporation from the time of its inception 
and the person whom all parties testified initiated or caused 
almost all of the corporate acts (he was the President from 
the beginning — he carried most of the corporate papers in 
his briefcase and he obtained the services of the corporation 
attorney and accountant and dealt with them without the 
presence or advice of other members of the corporation. 
/T 12, 13, 17, 39, 44, 71, 73, 91/) 
The execution of said agreement (Ex 2) was admitted 
by the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc., the corporation that 
executed it, but was denied for lack of knowledge or 
information by the Defendant Glen Peterson. (R 52) The 
evidence was clear that Plaintiff had the entire interest in 
the Marina property prior to his entanglement with the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
promoters of Joe's Valley, Inc. (T 45 & 47) and there was 
no evidence of Plaintiff's alienation of that interest other 
than by that agreement. The agreement was admitted in 
evidence by the Court and the Court specifically found, both 
in its Memorandum Decision and in its Findings of Fact (T 100, 
101, 104 & 105), that it was the agreement of the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. The agreement (Ex. 2) 
provided for the sale of the Marina property for various con-
siderations therein recited, including an agreement to pay 
the Plaintiff's debt to the Falsones in the sum of $20,000.00 
plus accrued interest, and for the immediate transfer without 
any kind of record encumbrance of the "use permit" which is 
the license agreement of the U. S. Forest Service to use 
the property in question, and can fairly be described as the 
cornerstone of the Marina property. The agreement further 
contained title retaining provisions and alternative forfeiture 
provisions in the event of default (Ex. 2). 
Defendant, Joe's Valley, Inc. almost fully failed 
to perform said agreement (T 175 & 177) and the Plaintiff 
received no consideration for it. He eventually began the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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instant action to declare the interest of the Defendant 
Joe's Valley, Inc. and all those claiming by or through 
it, including the Defendant Glen Peterson, forfeited and 
terminated and to regain possession of the Marina 
property (Rl-12). 
The Defendant Glen Peterson, who describes himself 
as a "promoter" (T 116) early in 1973, together with one 
Dave Parsons, sought to obtain an exchange of stock of 
Joe's Valley, Inc. for the stock of a corporation called 
Omega Silver Corporation (T 117, 120 - 121). In that 
connection he further attempted to obtain agreements to satisfy 
the debts of the Thomases and Falsones by paying them with 
Omega Silver Stock (T 121, 128). An agreement was apparently 
reached between Omega Silver Corporation and Joe's Valley, Inc. 
which was later abandoned or rescinded when an attorney for one 
of them pointed out a flaw in their scheme to sell stock to 
the public. At the time of the trial, less than one year 
later, the Defendant Peterson testified that Omega Silver 
Corporation was "pretty much defunct". (T 135) In connection 
with their efforts on behalf of Omega Silver Corporation, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Peterson and Parsons had many contacts with certain of the 
officers and directors of Joe's Valley, Inc., with the Plaintiff 
Thomas and with the Falsones, (T 120-130) as a result, of which 
they had full knowledge of the agreement between the Plaintiff 
Thomas and the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. They or the 
Defendant Glen Peterson, whose knowledge is pertinent hereto, 
were also aware that the agreement was in default because of * 
the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc.,'s almost total failure to f 
perform including their failure to pay the Falsones as they 
had agreed (T 130-131). In that connection Glen Peterson 
was advised in a meeting with this writer and the Falsones | 
shortly before he claimed to have entered into the agreement 
with the defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. on which his claim f 
>i 
H 
herein is predicated, that it would be pointless for the 
F^sones to deal with them (Omega) unless provisions were 
made to pay the Thomases (which provisions had not been made) 
because absent such provision, the Thomases would take the 
Marina property back in accordance with their title retaining 
contract. He was further advised that the Thomases intended 
to wait until the failure of the September 1st payment to 
bring their action. (T130 - 131) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In that state of affairs, Defendant Peterson acting 
this time for himself personally, went to three of the 
Twelve Directors (By-Laws of Joe's Valley, Inc., Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4, Article III, Section 1) and obtained an agreement 
to lease with an option to buy, the Marina property. (Ex. 10). 
The agreement, a typical promoter designed contract, 
provided for a rent of 207o of the net income from the 
operation of the Marina. There was no undertaking to operate 
the Marina in accordance with any specified standard, or at all. 
The lease further provided that it was entered into subject 
to the written approval of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service (Ex. 10), which approval was never obtained. (T 138) 
Note that at the time three of twelve Directors 
of the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. entered into that 
Agreement, they were in default -- knew that the Marina property 
would be re-taken from them by the Thomases and therefore had 
nothing to lose and hopefully something to gain by acquiesing 
in the proposal of Peterson. Thereafter, one of those 
Directors, Robert Carnivali, who is also the Secretary-
Treasurer of the corporation was able to locate almost no , 
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records (see page 89 where he first denied knowledge of a 
notice of intent to Dissolve the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc., 
filed prior to the execution of the Lease Agreement with Peterson 
and then when his signature on the N0tice was pointed out to 
him, acknowledged that he had signed said Notice) or recall 
any act of the corporation (T 71, 75, 90) other than that 
transaction with the Defendant Peterson about which he had a 
clear recollection. He also acknowledged the reimbursement 
by Peterson for some expenses he claimed he had assumed just 
a few days before trial (T 96). I 
In May 1974, just prior to the onset of the 1974 
marina season, Plaintiff brought a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
At the Hearing for said Motion, parties urged upon the Court 
the urgency as to time of determination as to who should have 
possession of the Marina property. The Court while denying 
the Motion for Summary Judgment offered and proposed a trial 
setting approximately 2-1/2 weeks hence, although no Notice 
of Readiness for Trial had been filed. All parties agreed and 
the matter was heard at that time. ; 
At the trial, Plaintiff simply subpoenaed the 
Secretary-Treasurer of the corporation and his books and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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records without benefit of a prior examination of records 
or a prior conversation or deposition of the Secretary-Treasurer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S TITLE RETAINING CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT PETERSON BECAUSE HE HAD 
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT WHEN HE ACQUIRED THE 
LEASE THROUGH WHICH HE NOW CLAIMS. 
There is apparently no question but that there 
was no performance by Joe's Valley, Inc. of its agreement 
(T 175-177) and that Plaintiff was entitled to forfeit and 
terminate the agreement and as between it and said Defendant, 
regain possession and title to the Marina property. The -;:--V 
question is only whether the Defendant Peterson obtained an 
interest that for some reason survived that forfeiture and 
termination. This is the question argued extensively on 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support thereof (R 87-92), and 
the only real question in the lawsuit. The rest are in 
reality afterthoughts thrown in, in a specious attempt to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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either confuse the trial Court or avoid its decision. 
Plaintiff admits that he did not file a copy of 
his Security Agreement with the Secretary of State as provided 
in UCH 70A-9-401 (1) (D) and as such (assuming the UCC is 
applicable) had only an unperfected Security Interest. 
Plaintiff contends first that the Forest Service 
Use Permit is an interest in real property as set forth in 
UCA 70A-9-104 which provides: 
"This Chapter does not apply: 
(a--i) - not applicable 
(j) except to the extent that provision 
is made for fixtures in section 70A-9-313, to the 
creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on 
real estate including a lease or rents thereunder;--
Plaintiff points out that the instrument through 
which Defendant Peterson claims, is styled a "Lease11 and 
describes a parcel of land in the North half of Section 6, 
Township 18 South, Range 6 East, (Ex. 9) etc. Plaintiff 
admittedly cannot find a case characterizing the application 
of that Section of UCC to a "use permit" and is therefore 
confined to a naked argument that the essential nature of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a "use permit11 is an interest in real property that strongly 
resembles a lease of such real property. The permit itself 
(Ex. 9) provides: " " 
"Permission is hereby granted -- to use subject 
,, ,v to the following conditions set out below, the 
following conditions set out below, the following 
described lands and improvements for the period 
of 16 years, 
The-* legal description is here sit out. In the 
interest of space, it is npt repeated herein, 
containing 10.4 acres!! 
!
 ltJ fdlldws that the;' transaction is specifically 
excluded frorh the Uniform Commercial Code/ 
If it"is included and Defendant-Petitioner is 
to avoid Plaintiff's security interest it must be pursuant 
to the provisions of UCA 70A-9-301 which provides: 
l!(l) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 
(2) an unperfected security interest is sub-
ordinate to the rights of, 
(a) - not applicable 
7 (b) - not applicable 
(c) - in the case of Goods instruments, 
documents, and chattel papers, a person who is not 
a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or 
other buyer not in ordinary course of business, to 
the extent that he gives value and receives delivery 
of the colateral without knowledge of the security 
interest and before it is perfected; !! 
That section provides three criteria for priority. 
The persons seeking such priority must, * 
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(a) Receive delivery of the collateral. 
In the instant case, Peterson acknowledged that he 
never obtained such possession. 
(b) Receive such delivery without knowledge 
of the security interest. In that connection, Plaintiff's 
evidence indicates that the Plaintiff told Defendant 
Peterson about his sales contract and gave him a copy (T 21 & 22) 
Mrs. Thomas testified that she complained to him that they 
had an agreement; that they needed money and that the 
agreement had not been performed (T 157 - 159) Moreover, 
much of Defendant Peterson's activity -- his dealings with 
the Thomases and particularly his dealings with the Falsones, 
was obviously done to satisfy the requirements of that 
agreement (T 120-130). 
Perhaps the most damning evidence of Defendant 
Peterson's knowledge is disclosed by the following questions 
asked him at trial and his answers thereto, at pages 130 and 
131 of the transcript. 
"Q. All right, then do you recall my telling you 
at that time that we could not enter into an agreement with 
you providing for payment out of the operation of the marina 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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because if you didn't take care of the obligation to the 
Thomas' they would take the marina away from both of us? 
A. That's right, you did tell me that, 
Q. And you told me that the obligation to the 
Thomas1 had been paid, the Thomas' would --
A. That arrangements had been made. 
Q. And I told you that the Thomas1 and their attorney 
did not agree with that did I not? 
A. You did. I would assume. 
Q. I further told you that there was a twenty-two 
thousand dollar payment due September 1st that had to be 
paid or that, or the Thomas1 would take the property back? 
A. And I told you to show me documentation. 
Q. Do you recall asking me to show you documentation? 
A. I do absolutely. 
Q. What did I say? 
A. What? 
Q. What do you claim I said? 
A. You didn't show me any documentation. 
Q. But I did tell you that Thomas1 had a title 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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retaining contract? 
A. Yes you did. You told me they had money coming, 
you didn't tell me, I don't recall title retaining contract. 
You may have said it, but I don't recall that in particular. 
Q. But I did tell you that if the obligation to 
the Thomas1 due in just a couple of months to pay twenty-two 
thousand wasn't paid that the Thomas1 would be in position 
to take the marina away from both you and us? 
A. That's right you did tell me that." 
The Court found in its memorandum Decision, 
and in its Findings of Fact, that the Defendant Peterson had 
full knowledge of said sales agreement and that it was in 
default when he attempted to acquire an interest in the Marina 
property (R 105, para. 5 and R 100, beg. at top of page). 
Plaintiff urges that its findings were correct and required 
by the evidence. 
Even if Defendant's knowledge was imperfect and 
Plaintiff contends the contrary, prior cases say tha he 
had such notice as to excite his attention or put him on guard 
he should be deemed conversant of such facts as a reasonable 
inquiry would lead him to. This Court in O'Reilly vs. 
McLean, 84 U. 551, 37 P. 2d 70 noted. 
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MWhatever is notice enough to excite attention 
and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry 
is notice of everything which inquiry might have 
led. When such a person has sufficient information 
to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant 
of it." 
The Court in that case involving water rights 
concluded that the subsequent purchaser had a duty to 
inquire as to whether the transferee of a portion of the 
land to which they applied had acquired the water rights 
in question and charged said purchaser with notice of that 
party's right, in spite of the dissenting Judge's conclusion, 
that the record was clear that he had no actual notice. 
The Court in Universal CIT Corporation vs. Courtesy 
Motors, 8 U. 2nd 275, 333 P. 2d 628, quoted the same language 
concluding that the purchaser of an automobile had a duty 
to inquire as to the contents of a missing portion of the 
Bill of Sale, when its torn condition put him on notice 
thereof. In Meager vs. Dean, 27 U. 173, 91 P. 2d 454, this 
Court held that notice of the possession of the tenant of 
real property was notice of possession of the landlord and 
imposed a duty to inquire as to the landlord's interest. 
j$&' {'M-* 
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In the O'Reilly vs. McLean case, the Court held the purchaser 
of real property had a duty of inquiry as to the status of 
a mortgage which he knew existed even though it was not 
disclosed by the record, even though his landlord had mislead 
him as to its validity. 
(c) The third criteria is that he gets priority 
only to the extent that he gives value. T 136 indicates j| 
the following question asked of the Defendant Peterson and II 
the following answer given. f| 
MQ But you have not paid anything to Joe's Valley, 
Inc. as a consideration for the lease that you claim? ui 
A Well, not on that. No, I guess I haven't.f! 1 
In summary, Plaintiff contends that the "use jfe 
permit" is an interest in real estate within the meaning 
# -
of UCA 70A-9-104 (j) and is therefore excluded from the 
provisions of UCC; That in any event the defendant Peterson 
is not a person who can take priority pursuant to UCA 70A-9-301 (c) 
because he did not take possession; did not get possession 
without knowledge and was in any event entitled to priority 
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only to the extend he gave consideration and he gave no 
consideration. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT PETERSON NEVER ACQUIRED AN 
INTEREST IN THE MARINA PROPERTY BECAUSE THE 
LEASE - OPTION AGREEMENT THROUGH WHICH HE 
CLAIMS IS BY ITS OWN TERMS SUBJECT TO THE 
WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE FOREST SERVICE 
WHICH WAS NEVER OBTAINED. 
The lease-option agreement provides (Ex. 10) 
in paragraph 8, 
"8. It is mutually understood and agreed that this 
lease and the agreements and provisions contained 
herein are entered into subject to the written 
approval of the United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service.11 
That approval was never obtained. Defendant 
Appellant Peterson admits at page 27 of his brief that it 
was not obtained, but claims that it was not obtained 
by reason of the action of Plaintiff, the Defendant Joe!s 
Valley, Inc. or unspecified third parties -- but he points 
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to no evidence that such approval was frustrated by anyone, 
nor does he explain why his failure to obtain such 
approval, it caused by Plaintiff or especially if caused 
by unspecified third parties, should avoid that term of 
his lease. 
Plaintiff urges that even if Defendant Peterson 
was such a purchaser for value that his claim was entitled 
to priority over the title retaining forfeiture claim of 
Plaintiff, his failure to obtain possession or title by 
the terms of his own contract, while the right or power 
to transfer title or possession of the party with whom he 
contracted (Joe's Valley, Inc.) was terminated, frustrates 
his ability^to obtain title of possession from the said 
Joe!s Valley, Inc. now or at some future time. The party 
with whom he contracted no longer has the means of fulfilling 
the executory contract. If the Defendant Peterson has a 
remedy it is with the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc,, the 
party with whom he contracted. 
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POINT H I 
THE SALES CONTRACT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT -- DEFENDANT PETERSON HAS NO STANDING 
TO OBJECT, SINCE THE DEFENDANT JOEfS VALLEY, INC. 
WITH WHOM THE CONTRACT WAS MADE, ADMITTED IT. 
Plaintiff's principle action was against the 
Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc., to declare the contract with 
that Defendant forfeited and terminated. (see Prayer of 
Plaintiff's Complaint /R 6 & 7/). Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's 
Complaint alleged the signing and execution of the sales 
contract in question on the 19th day of April, 1972 (R 12). 
Copy of the sales contract was annexed to the Complaint, 
Exhibit "A" (R 1 - 5). Joe's Valley, Inc. admitted the 
allegations of paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Company (R 86). 
29 Am Jur 740, Evidence, Section 687, states the 
general rule. 
"it is one of the elementary rules of pleading 
that a party is not required to prove those 
allegations admitted by his adversary to be true." 
See also annotations at 14 A.L.R. 87, Supplemented at 
90 A.L.R. 1411 (an examination of the Blue Book Supplement 
by this writer did not locate a Utah case.) 
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In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that in as 
much as the contract was between Plaintiff and the Defendant 
Joe's Valley, Inc., it was necessary to construe it only as 
between those parties, and the Defendant Peterson was not 
competent to object to the introduction of it since the 
parties to the contract each relied on it and where one 
party claims by it in his complaint and the other admitted it 
in his answer. When the Court determined that the interest 
in the Marina property of the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. 
should be forfeited and terminated pursuant to the terms of 
the contract between those contracting parties, it had then 
only to further determine, whether other parties claiming 
through Joe's Valley, Inc. had for some reason obtained an 
interest in the property with a priority superior to that of 
Plaintiff's, and absent that, to conclude that said parties 
did not have an interest in the property, their remedy if any, 
being upon their contract with Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. 
with whom they dealt. But the propriety of admitting said 
contract does not depend on the foregoing. Article IV, 
Section 7 of the By-Laws (Ex. 4) of the Defendant Joe's 
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Valley, Inc. which had been admitted in evidence, provides 
for the duties of the President, as follows: 
"He shall sign and make all contracts and 
agreements in the name of the corporation, 
and see that they are properly carried out." 
The provision relating to the duties of the 
Board of Directors, Article III, Section 9, say generally 
the directors shall have the control and general management 
of the affairs and business of the corporation; they shall 
fix compensation of the officers and sell shares of stock 
of the corporation. They did not provide that they shall 
authorize the execution of contracts entered into by the 
corporation directly or inferrentially. Plaintiff contends 
the authority to make a contract by the President and in 
the absence of a delegation of authority to the Board of 
Directors to approve such contracts, renders the contract 
signed by the President binding against the corporation and 
consequently proof that it was signed by the President for 
the corporation proves that it was a contract of the 
corporation. It was competent for the By-Laws to provide that 
the President should make the contracts of the corporation. 
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In that regard UCA 16-10-25 provides in part: 
"The By-Laws may contain any provision for the 
regulation and management of the affairs of the 
corporation not inconsistent with law or Articles 
of Incorporation.11 
It will be helpful to here review the evidence 
before the Court when it admitted the sales contract, (Ex. 2) 
Plaintiff testified the contract was signed by the President, 
Julian Taylor, at a meeting of the Board of Directors. He 
samed seven of the Directors that were present at the 
meeting (T 10 & 11). (Article III, Section A of the By-Laws 
provides that a majority of the twelve Directors shall con-
stitute a quorum) He further testified that he missed some 
of what went on in the meeting, as he was examining the 
contract (T 11). He testified that he had never transferred 
his interest in the property known as Joe's Valley Marina 
except by that contract (T 65 & 66) and a pre-corporation 
agreement by and between the same parties containing the same 
provisions as Ex. 2 (T 8), that was preliminary to and 
preceded said Ex. 2. There was abundant testimony that the 
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Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. had taken possession and control 
of the Marina and there was no explanation of any authorization 
for their doing so, except the subject sales agreement. 
Plaintiff could not testify as to the specific 
vote of the Board of Directors regarding the approval of the 
contract and he did not produce a minute record of the Board 
of Directors approving such authorization. In that regard 
the Secretary-Treasurer of the Corporation who had been 
supoenaed by Plaintiff testified that he was aware of the 
sales agreement in question but did not have any of the minute 
records and he did not know what happened to them (T 75). 
The testimony of said Secretary - Treasurer was vague and 
Plaintiff contends and the Court held in its Memorandum 
Decision (para 2, R 101) that his testimony taken as a 
whole indicated that the books and records of the corporation 
were carelessly and imperfectly kept. 
On that state of evidence of the Court admitted 
the sales agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 in evidence and 
in his Memorandum Decision and in his Findings of Fact held 
that it was the agreement of the parties. 
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In the 1961 case of Peterson vs. Holmgren Land 
& Livestock Company, 12 U 2nd 125, 363 P. 2d 786, this 
Court quoted with approval a rule stated in Am Jur as follows: 
!lIf a corporate officer assumes or contracts on 
behalf of the corporation, at least one to whom 
authority to make such a contract may be given, 
a person dealing with him in good faith is not 
affected by the fact that the proper steps to 
clothe him with such authority were not taken." ^ 
''.•''' •
 ;
 ••'•" .r^§;";' 
It was contended as here, that there was no evidence 
of authorization by the Directors of the corporation for the 
execution of the contract. The Court pointed out that the 
Minutes were for the most part written in a brief and 
indefinite manner. Plaintiff urges that the ostensible *\ 
authority relied on by the Court in Peterson case, is 
substantially less adequate than that shown in the instant 
case, where the By-Laws of which Plaintiff, the party entering 
into the contract, was aware, specifically stated that the 
President had authority to make contracts for the corporation. 
Judge Sheya in his Memorandum Decision, found that 
the books and records of the corporation were so carelessly 
and imperfectly kept as to not show the acts of the corporation 
and cited 29 Am Jur 2nd 536 as authority for the proposition 
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that in such event such acts can be proved by parol, in the 
absence of statute to the contrary. Plaintiff believes that 
he cannot gainsay the Court's statement and merely endorses i 
The corporation Joe!s Valley, Inc. accepted and 
retained the benefits of the sales contract in question. 
(This action and appeal arises because of an alleged lease 
and sale of the property the corporation received from the 
Plaintiff through said sales contract.) 7 Fletcher 
Encyclopedia corporations Section 3011 (1964 Revised) 
Volume 7, Page 79, recites the rule as follows: 
"In like manner a corporation which has 
received the consideration of a contract cannot 
defend against an action on the contract on the 
ground that the provisions of the Statute, 
Charter or By-Laws prescribing the form of the 
contract or the mode of executing it were not 
complied with by the officer acting for the 
corporation in the execution of the contract. In 
other words, any informality in executing a 
contract is waived, and cannot be set us as a 
defense where the corporation has accepted and 
obtained the benefits of the contract." 
Cases from several different jurisdictions, not 
including Utah were cited insupport of said rule. 
In summary, Plaintiff contends: 
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A. The agreement was properly admitted because 
Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. against whom it was being con-
strued, admitted it and the Defendant Peterson was not 
competent to object to it. 
B. Even if Joe's Valley, Inc. had not admitted 
it, and if they had in fact object to it, Plaintiff's string 
of proof is complete because the By-Laws gave the President 
the right to make contracts. And this contract was made by 
said President. 
C. Absent such By-Laws, Plaintiff's string 
of proof is complete because of President Julian Taylor's 
ostensible authority to act for the corporation. 
D. Even if the sales contract was otherwise 
inadmissable, it was admissable as an act of the corporation, 
because the corporation had the benefit of the contract and 
could not take such benefit and at the same time deny the 
contract. 
E. Finally, it was competent to admit the 
contract, absent the minute entry authorizing the execution 
thereof, by the Board of Directors of the corporation because 
the records of the corporation were carelessly and 
imperfectly kept. 
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POINT IV 
TO SUCCESSFULLY ASSERT HIS PROPERTY INTEREST IN 
THE MARINA PROPERTY, DEFENDANT PETERSON MUST 
ESTABLISH AND PROVE HIS OWN CHAIN OF TITLE 
OF WHICH THE SALES CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF IS 
AN ESSENTIAL LINK. 
It is clear that Plaintiff is the original owner 
of the Marina property -- he obtained it from the government 
and built it with his own hands (T 6). He testified that 
except for the execution of the sales contract (Ex. 2) and 
his actions pursuant thereto, he never transferred it to 
Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. or Joe's Valley, Inc. and that 
he never received stock of the corporation by either name 
(T 64-65). There was no evidence introduced by Defendant 
Peterson or otherwise of a transfer out of Plaintiff to 
the corporation other than the execution of the sales contract 
and acts pursuant thereto. Inasmuch as the Defendant Peterson 
claims an Interest in the property through an agreement with 
Defendant Joers Valley, Inc. it would seem that he would be 
anxious to admit proof of the only channel through which that 
Defendant could have obtained title to it, to-wit: the sales 
agreement to which it objects so strenuously. 
This Court has many times declared the familiar 
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rule, that in an action to quiet title which this action, 
at least as between Plaintiff Thomas and Defendant Peterson, 
essentially is, that a Claimant must succeed by virtue of the 
strength of his own title rather than on the weakness of 
the competing claimant's title. Mercur Coalition Mining 
Company vs. Cannon 112 U 13, 184 P. 2d 341; Homeowners 
Loan Corporation vs Dudley, 105 U 208, 141 P. 2d 160. 
Defendant Peterson has here attempted to parlay 
Plaintiff's failure to obtain the corporation minute records 
where the corporation Secretary did not have it nor know 
where it was, into an advoidance of the terms of the sales 
agreement where his own claim of title is dependent upon the 
corporation's title which in turn is dependent upon that 
self same sales agreement. 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ARE PRESUMED CORRECT, IT HAVING HEARD ALL OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND OBSERVED THE WITNESSES. 
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5 Am Jur 2nd 4 recites the rule generally as follows: 
!!The scope of appellate review is largely influenced 
by number of rebuttable presumptions, preiminent 
among which is that which, at least where the 
decision has been entered by a Court of general 
jurisdiction, assumes the correctness of the 
decision or ruling appealed from and the regularity 
of the proceedings below. Thus, every reasonable 
intendment favorable to a ruling of the Court below 
will be indulged, and in the absence of affirmative 
showing to the contrary, a ruling of the Court 
below will be presumed to have been properly made 
and for sound reasons.11 
Numerous Utah cases have observed the rule in one 
way or another. See the list at footnote 3, Utah vs One 
Porshe 526 P. 2d 918 (September 1974), (Utah report not yet 
cited), at page 918. This perhaps obvious rule is here 
stated to give Plaintiff an opportunity to note and discuss 
some of the facts claimed by Defendant Peterson in his 
brief with which Plaintiff does not agree and about which 
there is contrary evidence. 
First Defendant Peterson claims that the corporation 
Joe's Valley, Marina, Inc. possessed the former assets of 
Joefs Valley Marina -- but that is not so. Plaintiff 
testified that he operated and had possession of it until 
the time that he executed the sales contract agreement; that 
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"Marina", expanded the powers section and removed any . • 
•preemptive rights. _, ,; : f ,. .. : t , 
- "-. - At page 4 of Appellant's brief, he claims 
the Plaintiff claims the transfer by the sales agreement 
from Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. to Joe's Valley, Inc. which 
is simply not so. The sales agreement is from Plaintiff 
personally to the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. (Ex. 2). ; 
Apparently his purpose was to visit some corporate rules 
regarding bulk sales on Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. because 
he then claims those rules were not observed, (page 7 
Appellant's brief). .
 v _ : 
He attempts the same thing regarding purported 
r. rules regarding the sale of real estate at page. 9 and 10 
of his brief, but that attempt is specious for the same 
reason, to-wit: the sale was not from Joe's Valley 
Marina, Inc. but from Plaintiff personally. ,,t 
At page 15 of his brief, Appellant refers to the 
corporation as Plaintiff's, but the Articles of Incorporation 
(Ex. 3) and By-Laws (Ex. 4) will show that the Plaintiff was 
•only one of twelve Directors; he never had stock; he was 
not the President, and he did not choose or direct the 
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' • ' ' • * • * -' ' , < ;•'* • * " ,*•* 1 
accountants or the attorneys for the corporation (T 17, 39, 
445 73) -- it seems less than fair to claim that he was 
dealing with the corporation as though it was his. 
At page 16, he asserts that the corporation sought 
to set the sales contract aside -- but the corporation admitted 
the execution of the contract (R 86). It is only the Appellant 
Peterson who wishes to set the contract aside. 
At page 17, Appellant Peterson aludes to the trial 
Courts Memorandum Decision that Plaintiff was a 1007o stock 
holder of Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. As is clear from all of 
Plaintiff's testimony, he did not ever receive stock in the 
corporation, or transfer anything into it while it was Marina, 
Inc. (T 64-66). It is true that Plaintiff was the owner of 
the Marina property, which was an intended asset of the 
corporation and the subject of a pre-incorporation agreement 
(T 7, 6, 8). Plaintiff urges that that is the sense of Plaintiff's 
testimony, and the meaning of the Court's comment in the 
Memorandum Decision. 
At page 17 of his brief, Appellant Peterson says, 
r!And it does not appear that the Plaintiff treated 
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.i the property as his own in his individual 
tax returns for 1971 and 1972." 
That is a particularly devious statement since 
it is technically true, but terribly misleading. The 
truth is that the converse also does not appear -- in 
fact that is nothing in the record about how the Plaintiff 
treated the property on his tax returns. 
Appellant Peterson asserts at page 19 of his 
brief that the Plaintiff allowed the corporation to carry 
on its existence as though it owned all of the referred to 
property, but that is neither true nor, except for Defendant 
Peterson's claim that he was mislead, is not supported in 
the record. With respect to Peterson's being mislead, the 
Court correctly found that Peterson had full knowledge of 
the contract as is more fully argued at another point herein. 
(Argument Point II at pages 13-15). Appellant Peterson seems 
to say at Page 27 of his brief that he was precluded from 
performing the conditions of his lease and that he failed 
to obtain the approval of the Forest Service by reason of 
the acts of Plaintiff or the Defendant Joe's Valley, Inc. -
or others -- but such assertion was not proved and is not 
supported in the record. 
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Appellant Peterson's points II, III and IV depend 
on the distortion of facts asserted by him. With respect to 
Point II, that the contract was voidable because Plaintiff 
breached his fiduciary duty, first, the corporation did not 
seek to avoid the contract -- see its answer (R 84-68). 
Second, the corporation was formed to take advantage of a 
pre-incorporation agreement regarding the sale of the Marina 
property -- the sales contract was only an affirmation by 
the corporation of the earlier agreement. Third, Plaintiff 
was in any event only one of twelve Directors of the 
corporation; and not the moving party in its corporate 
affairs and hardly in a position to self deal with the 
corporation. 
With respect to Point III that the Marina property 
was already the property of Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. --
that is only a distortion of the facts. Plaintiff testified 
that he owned all of the Marina property personally; that he 
only transferred or agreed to transfer it by the sales 
agreement in question and the pre-incorporation agreement 
that preceded it. The change from Joe's Valley Marina, Inc. 
to Joe's Valley, Inc. was only a change of name and a small 
modification of the Articles of Incorporation. 
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With respect to Point IV which Plaintiff construes 
to be that Plaintiff allowed the corporation to carry on its 
existence as if it owned the Marina property and should 
therefore be estopped to deny it -- even if there was 
evidence in support of that claim, which Plaintiff denies, 
the only person to assert said estoppel is the Defendant 
Peterson who the evidence clearly shows was aware of the 
sales agreement. (Ex. 2). 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Sheya heard the testimony, observed the 
witnesses and decided the matter correctly. His decision 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted: 
., %.,aXJl £ M — ( — 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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